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I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine a scenario where a suspect has willingly waived his
Miranda rights and agreed to speak to a police officer without an attorney
present. The officer begins the interrogation with the simple statement, “I’d
like to talk to you about a woman who was stabbed last year.” The suspect
takes a moment to process the statement, suddenly begins to cry, and gives a
full confession to the crime. The officer proceeds to use standard
interrogation tactics and asks a series of questions, which are quickly
answered with details from the suspect describing his commission of the
crime. Throughout the entire interrogation the suspect is unusually eager to
provide answers, and is willing to incriminate himself without hesitation.
Most importantly, all of the details focus on how he stabbed the victim.1
This scenario would seem like a successful interrogation from the
perspective of an officer who received the standard “pre-service”
interrogation training offered by state police academies today.2 On the other
hand, to an officer who has been properly trained in how to identify
developmentally disabled individuals, the above scenario would raise

1
See infra Part II.B.4.a (illustrating the case history of Earl Washington’s false
confession to the crimes of rape and murder, for which he was ultimately exonerated due to
DNA evidence).
2
See infra note 26 (explaining the interrogation training received at the police
academies in the state of Minnesota).
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numerous red flags as to the credibility of the confession and the
voluntariness of the waiver.3
Developmentally disabled individuals are one of the most vulnerable
groups of individuals subject to the criminal justice system.4 The two
primary factors that account for this vulnerability are: (1) not all of these
individuals manifest physical characteristics commonly associated with
developmental disability that would otherwise make them easy to identify;
and (2) these individuals have a predisposition to pleasing authority figures. 5
The resulting problem is that officers who do not identify these
individuals proceed with a standard administration of Miranda warnings,
which are frequently waived involuntarily due to a lack of comprehension.6
Moreover, officers use standard interrogation tactics, which have the effect
of eliciting false confessions when used on developmentally disabled
individuals.7 Individuals of ordinary intelligence are far more capable of
withstanding the psychological pressures associated with standard
interrogation tactics than are developmentally disabled individuals, leaving
this population vulnerable during interrogations. The criminal justice system
needs to have safeguards in place so that: (1) developmentally disabled
individuals will be identified by police officers prior to an interrogation; (2)
steps will be taken to ensure their comprehension of the Miranda warnings
and their right to waive them; and (3) specific interrogation tactics will be
used to avoid eliciting false confessions. Such safeguards will ultimately
limit the number of innocent individuals who, as a result of their disability,
give false confessions to crimes they have not committed, like the suspect
from the above scenario, Earl Washington.
Part II of this article explains what it means to be developmentally
disabled, and how developmental disability differs from mental illness,
especially regarding treatment from the criminal justice system.8 Part II also
provides examples of standard interrogation tactics, recommended
interrogation tactics, and existing practices and proposals to combat the
problem of involuntary waivers and false confessions. Additionally, Part II
3

See infra Part III.A.1 (explaining how improvements in police education will
help limit the number of invalid waivers of Miranda warnings and false confessions by
developmentally disabled suspects).
4
See infra Part II.B (explaining cases where developmentally disabled
individuals falsely confessed to crimes, were convicted, and ultimately pardoned after further
investigation proved their innocence).
5
See infra Part II.A (explaining the common challenges associated with
identifying developmentally disabled individuals); infra notes 18–19 and accompanying text
(explaining challenges associated with developmentally disabled individuals’ predisposition to
pleasing authority figures).
6
See infra Part II.A (explaining factors that contribute to developmentally
disabled individuals’ inability to adequately comprehend Miranda rights).
7
See infra Part II.B (explaining the characteristics of developmentally disabled
individuals that render them unusually susceptible to influence by authority figures, and their
inability to withstand psychological pressures of interrogations).
8
See infra Part II.
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illustrates through various cases how developmental disability relates to false
confessions and involuntary waivers of Miranda rights.
Part III offers new proposals for how to limit the number of
involuntary waivers and false confessions given by developmentally disabled
individuals in the future while highlighting the flaws of existing practices.9
Such proposals include: improving police training in how to recognize and
interrogate developmentally disabled individuals; implementing the Basic
Intelligence Test to be administered to individuals who will be interrogated
for felony-level crimes; and requiring specific interrogation tactics and
independent corroboration for any confessions given by developmentally
disabled individuals. To ensure the safeguards are not so protective that it
becomes impossible to prosecute those who are in fact guilty of committing
crimes, developmentally disabled individuals should not be categorically
prohibited from giving voluntary waivers or confessions. Part IV concludes
with a summary of the problem and the safeguards that must be put into
place to protect these individuals who, by the very nature of their disability,
are incapable of protecting themselves.10
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Platform for Vulnerability: What It Means to Be Developmentally
Disabled
It has been well established by courts and scholars that
developmentally disabled individuals are considered one of the most
vulnerable groups of people subject to the criminal justice system, especially
in the setting of police interrogations.11 Many factors account for their
vulnerability, beginning with the nature of their development in the early

9

See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
11
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002); State v. Ives, 648 A.2d 129, 142
(Vt. 1994); State v. Lockwood, 632 A.2d 655, 668–69 (Vt. 1993); People v. Braggs, 810
N.E.2d 472, 484 (Ill. 2003); Chinn v. Warden, No. 3:02–cv–512, 2011 WL 5338973, at *20
(S.D. Ohio Oct. 14, 2011); Steven A. Drizin & Richard Leo, The Problem of False
Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 919 (2004) (stating
developmentally disabled individuals are vulnerable to pressures of interrogation, and are
“therefore less likely to possess or be able to muster the psychological resources or
perspective necessary to withstand accusatorial police questioning”); Brandon L. Garrett,
False Confessions, 37 LITIGATION 54, 56 (2011); Zhiyuan Guo, Approaching Visible Justice:
Procedural Safeguards for Mental Examinations in China’s Capital Cases, 33 HASTINGS
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 21, 45 (2010) (comparing Chinese and American laws and identifying
developmentally disabled individuals as among the most vulnerable and “in the greatest need
of effective defense” in the United States); Meghan Morris, The Decision Zone: The New
Stage of Interrogation Created by Berghuis v. Thompkins, 39 AM. J. CRIM. L. 271, 283–84
(2012) (citing State v. Lawrence, 920 A.2d 236, 264 (Conn. 2007) (Palmer, J., concurring)).
10
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stages of life.12 A person is developmentally disabled (mentally retarded)13
when he or she has:
significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning
(Criterion A) that is accompanied by significant limitations
in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill
areas:
communication,
self-care,
home
living,
social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, selfdirection, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health,
and safety (Criterion B). The onset must occur before age 18
years (Criterion C).14
General intellectual functioning under Criterion A refers to the intelligence
quotient (IQ or IQ equivalent) score a person receives from administration of
any standardized intelligence test.15 “Significantly subaverage” is generally
measured at an IQ of 70 or below.16 As developmentally disabled individuals
progress through adolescence and into adulthood, they often exhibit
characteristics that make them particularly vulnerable during police
interrogations, allowing police to frequently obtain confessions that are later
discovered to be false.17
The characteristic that makes these individuals the most vulnerable
during interrogations is their predisposition to being eager to please and defer
to authority figures.18 Because they are so eager to please authority figures,
12

See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 41 (4th ed. 2000).
13
“Developmentally disabled” and “mentally retarded” may generally be used
interchangeably, but this article will primarily use “developmentally disabled.”
14
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 12, at 41.
15
Id.
16
Id. “[T]here is a measurement error of approximately 5 points in assessing IQ .
. . . Thus, it is possible to diagnose Mental Retardation in individuals with IQs between 70 and
75 who exhibit significant deficits in adaptive behavior.” Id. at 41–42. Additionally, the
opposite is true, and a person with an IQ below 70 would not be diagnosed as mentally
retarded if they had sufficient adaptive functioning. Id. at 42. The score for a person with a
normal range of intelligence is between 90–110. See Rodrigo de la Jara, IQ Basics, IQ
COMPARISON SITE, http://www.iqcomparisonsite.com/IQBasics.aspx (last visited Apr. 5,
2014). Adaptive functioning under Criterion B identifies how well a person copes with the
demands of everyday life and how independent they are compared to what would be expected
of a person in their age group, sociocultural background, and community who is not deficient
in adaptive functioning. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 12, at 42.
17
See Garrett, supra note 11, at 56 (explaining that it is known that innocent
people falsely confess to crimes they have not committed, and that many of these people are
developmentally disabled or others similarly situated who are vulnerable to police pressure);
see also Drizin & Leo, supra note 11, at 971 (“[T]he unique vulnerability of the mentally
retarded to psychological interrogation techniques and the risk that such techniques when
applied to the mentally retarded may produce false confessions is well-documented in the
false confession literature.”).
18
See Drizin & Leo, supra note 11, at 920; Morris, supra note 11, at 297–98;
Singletary v. Fischer, 365 F. Supp. 2d 328, 334 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) [hereinafter Singletary II]
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they frequently agree with statements made by police officers, regardless of
truth, and willingly waive their Miranda rights in an effort to appear
cooperative with officers, despite not understanding the warnings.19
Additionally, they become confused easily, are concrete as opposed to
abstract thinkers, and are unable to appreciate the severity of a situation or
the long-term effects of their statements and actions.20 Based on these
characteristics, it becomes easier to understand why developmentally
disabled individuals account for a high number of false confession cases.21
The United States Supreme Court has even cited the high risk of false
confessions as a primary reason for why these individuals are exempt from
the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.22
Another reason these individuals are so vulnerable is the fact that
their condition is not always readily apparent to the officers conducting the
interrogations.23 Officers may recognize that a person is responding slowly,
(quoting expert testimony that found “individuals with IQ scores in the range [of
developmental disability] are generally more suggestible, more readily manipulable and more
eager to please and comply with authority than those of average intelligence”).
19
See generally Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution,
Confessions, and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495, 511–14 (2002)
(discussing characteristics that render developmentally disabled people especially susceptible
to police pressures); Emily Bretz, Note, Don’t Answer the Door: Montejo v. Louisiana
Relaxes Police Restrictions for Questioning Non-Custodial Defendants, 109 MICH. L. REV.
221, 245 (2010) (discussing developmentally disabled individuals’ inability to understand the
need for counsel and propensity to waive their right to counsel).
20
Drizin & Leo, supra note 11, at 920; see, e.g., Lockwood, 632 A.2d at 672
(explaining that if an officer asks a developmentally disabled suspect whether he knows where
the gun is, the defendant would say “yes” because that is a concrete answer to the question;
however, the suspect cannot abstractly comprehend this answer to mean either, “[d]o you
mean I should take you to it, or do you mean I should bring it to you[?]”).
21
Drizin & Leo, supra note 11, at 920–21. Because developmentally disabled
individuals are susceptible to non-physical forms of coercion more than a person of normal
intelligence, they are less likely to be able to handle the psychological stress and fear that
occur during a police interrogation. Singletary II, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 334. Additionally, it is
not uncommon for a false confession to occur because, when developmentally disabled
individuals lie, they do not exhibit the same fears of consequences that people of ordinary
intelligence do, and do not feel the same levels of guilt, remorse, or shame when interrogated
that others do. See FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 403–04
(4th ed. 2004) (explaining the difficulties interrogators face when questioning an unintelligent
or uneducated suspect).
22
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320–21. Additionally, the court cited the reduced capacity
of mentally retarded offenders as a justification for the exemption from the death penalty. Id.
23
Id. at 317 (explaining that in the dispute over executing developmentally
disabled individuals, the difficulty is in determining which offenders are in fact
developmentally disabled); see, e.g., Faris v. State, 901 N.E.2d 1123, 1124 (Ind. Ct. App.
2009). A 28-year-old father with an IQ between 52–62 was interrogated by police officers
regarding whether he had sexually molested his daughter, to which he admitted to touching his
daughter’s “pee pee.” Id. Both interrogating officers testified they did not realize he was
developmentally disabled because nothing seemed out of the ordinary about him. Id. at 1127.
The court acknowledged that the defendant’s use of the phrase “pee pee” to describe his
daughter’s vagina was an odd term for a 28-year-old man to use and a potential red flag, but
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but will not suspect a disability if the response is still rational.24 Part of the
problem is that there are four degrees of developmental disability that are
hard for the untrained interrogators to differentiate: mild, moderate, severe,
and profound.25 About 85% of developmentally disabled individuals fall into
the mild category, which is difficult for police officers to identify unless that
person portrays obvious deficiencies in his or her mental development.26
Even more problematic is that the Supreme Court has refused to offer
guidance by way of establishing a test to be used to determine when a person
is developmentally disabled and, instead, has left it to the states to craft their
own laws and tests.27
the court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to prove the officers knew or should
have known he was developmentally disabled. Id. at 1127 n.4.
24
See Morris, supra note 11, at 298.
25
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 12, at 42.
26
Id. at 43. Individuals with mild mental retardation often go unnoticed by the
casual observer. Cloud et al., supra note 19, at 510. These individuals have an IQ between 55–
70 and can live successfully either independently or with supervision. Id.
Each person who intends to become a law enforcement officer in Minnesota must
complete the pre-service education and training, apply for and pass the Peace Officer
Licensing Examination or the Reciprocity Licensing Examination, and must meet the peace
officer selection standards and be appointed by a law enforcement agency. See generally
Minnesota Police Academies, POLICE LINK, http://policelink.monster.com/content/become-acop-in-minnesota-police-academy-directory (last visited Mar. 29, 2014); Telephone Interview
with John Wahlberg, Peace Officer, North Saint Paul, MN (Apr. 10, 2013). A law
enforcement instructor at the Alexandria Technical College Police Academy (“ATCPA”)
confirmed that, as of 2013, “pre-service instruction” at ATCPA does not include information
regarding how to recognize either developmentally disabled or mentally ill individuals who do
not manifest physical characteristics of either group. Telephone Interview with Duane Wolfe,
Law Enforcement Instructor, ATCPA, Alexandria, MN (Apr. 9, 2013). He commented that
there is “some information” given regarding how to deal with mentally ill suspects, but not a
formal course dedicated to it. Id. Additionally, Officer Wolfe noted that there has been a “big
push” over the past few years to require more “in-service instruction” regarding how to handle
mentally ill people, but so far no major changes have been made to “in-service instruction”
regarding instruction on developmentally disabled individuals. Id. There is, however,
instruction provided on standard interrogation tactics to be used on suspects. Id. Officer
Wahlberg agreed that more training needs to be provided to officers regarding
developmentally disabled individuals because, until the author informed him of how difficult
it is to identify a developmentally disabled individual who does not have obvious physical
characteristics, he was unaware this problem even existed. Telephone Interview with John
Wahlberg. Once the author informed him of the cases and scholarship documenting how
frequently officers interrogate developmentally disabled individuals without realizing it, he
became very interested in what types of training could help combat this and expressed support
for the idea of implementing such training. Id.
27
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (stating that in the context of the death penalty, it is the
states’ responsibility to determine whether someone is developmentally disabled and exempt
from or not subject to the death penalty); see also Cloud et al., supra note 19, at 507–08
(explaining that “[f]or centuries, Anglo-American law has recognized that some legal
standards of general application cannot be applied to mentally retarded people,” and that tests
were developed to determine whether someone was an “idiot” or “imbecile” and therefore not
subject to usual legal standards). For example, the “Twenty Pence Test” was used in the early
part of the twentieth century, dating back to the Middle Ages, to determine whether someone
was developmentally disabled. Id. (citing S. SHELDON GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE
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Officers and others involved in the criminal justice system also
struggle to recognize the differences between a person who is
developmentally disabled and one who is mentally ill.28 For example:
Unlike mental illness, which is often temporary, cyclical, or
episodic, mental retardation is permanent; while the
consequences of mental retardation can be ameliorated
through education and “habilitation,” it has no cure. Thus,
unlike individuals suffering from mental illness, mentally
retarded persons’ social and intellectual abilities are
essentially fixed; a mentally retarded person will be no better
able to resist coercive interrogation or comprehend a waiver
form after a few days rest than he or she was before.29
Additionally, mentally ill people encounter disturbances in their thought
processes and emotions, while developmentally disabled individuals suffer
from limited abilities to learn.30 Whether an officer is interrogating a person
who is developmentally disabled, mentally ill, or of ordinary intelligence, the
problem remains: how will officers know to treat them differently if the
officers cannot first recognize that there is a distinction to make? The
resulting consequence, which is equally problematic, is that when officers
are unable to identify developmentally disabled individuals, they use the
same interrogation tactics as they would on individuals of ordinary
intelligence, which inevitably results in a high rate of involuntary waivers
and false confessions.31
CRIMINAL LAW 128 (Little, Brown 1925 (quoting A. FITZHERBERT, NATURA BREVIUM (1534)).
Under this test, an “idiot” was someone who could not count twenty pence, tell who his
mother or father were, how old he was, or what things in life were of value to him. Id. But, if
he could read, generally that was a sign he was not an “idiot.” Id.
28
Paul T. Hourihan, Note, Earl Washington’s Confession: Mental Retardation
and the Law of Confessions, 81 VA. L. REV. 1471, 1492 (1995). Officer Wahlberg expressed
that he was unaware how often the two groups of people are confused, which became clear
when he realized that each time the author asked him about his experience with
developmentally disabled individuals, he responded with stories of dealing with mentally ill
people. Telephone Interview with John Wahlberg, supra note 26.
29
Hourihan, supra note 28, at 1492; see James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson,
Symposium on the ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards: Mentally Retarded
Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 424 (1985) (citing Durham v. United
States, 214 F.2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (“We use ‘disease’ in the sense of a condition
which is considered capable of either improving or deteriorating. We use ‘defect’ in the sense
of a condition which is not considered capable of either improving or deteriorating and which
may be either congenital, or the result of injury, or the residual effect of a physical or mental
disease”), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir.
1972)).
30
Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 29, at 424.
31
See, e.g., Faris, 901 N.E.2d at 1127 (“One of the officers testified that if she
had suspected Faris had a mental disability, she would have terminated the interview and
sought further guidance on how to proceed from the prosecutor’s office.”).
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B. How Vulnerability During Police Interrogations Results in Involuntary
Waivers and False Confessions
1. Standard Police Interrogation Tactics
Police officers often engage in a variety of tactics during an
interrogation to learn the truth, which may or may not result in a
confession.32 Most individuals are reluctant to simply admit guilt without any
probing from officers, and therefore suspects must frequently be
psychologically persuaded to confess to the crimes they have committed.33
Trickery and deceit are two primary interrogation methods that are permitted
to obtain information from suspects.34 Another tactic often used is presenting
the suspect with leading questions that provide multiple options for why a
suspect committed the crime, all of which may elicit an admission of guilt.35
One set of scholars, Drizin and Leo, explained an interrogation as a
two-step process, where the first step is designed to shift the suspect from
confident to hopeless, and the second elicits the confession by persuading the
suspect that the benefits of compliance outweigh the costs of resistance or
denial.36 In the first step, the officer will try to convince the suspect that
everyone knows he or she is guilty and there is nothing he or she can do to
change the situation.37 In the second step, the officer will attempt to convey
that the only way for the suspect to improve his or her situation is to admit to
some form of guilt.38 To accomplish this, the officer will present the suspect
with the idea that some sort of moral, procedural, or legal benefit will be

32

INBAU ET AL., supra note 21, at 8 (explaining the purpose of an interrogation).
Id. at 484.
34
Id. at 484–86. These tactics cannot be of such a nature that would “shock the
conscience” of either the court or surrounding community, or be likely to induce a false
confession. Id. at 486.
35
Id. at 358–60.
36
Drizin & Leo, supra note 11, at 915 (citing Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe,
The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DEN. U. L. REV.
979, 1004–50 (1997)).
37
Id. The focus is on accusation, dismissive behavior, and ignoring assertions of
innocence from the suspect. Id. Alibis are frequently attacked as inconsistent or impossible,
even if the officer does not believe that to be the case. Id. The most persuasive tactic is to
present the suspect with “objective and incontrovertible evidence of his or her guilt, whether
or not any actually exists.” Id. (citing Stephen Moston et al., The Effects of Case
Characteristics on Suspect Behaviour During Police Questioning, 32 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY
23, 34–39 (1992)). “American police often confront suspects with fabricated evidence, such as
nonexistent eyewitnesses, false fingerprints, make-believe videotapes, fake polygraph results,
and so on.” Id. When the officers actually have evidence, they will often portray it as
conclusive of guilt, even if that is not the case. Drizin & Leo, supra note 11, at 915 (citing Leo
& Ofshe, supra note 36, at 1004–50).
38
Id. at 915–16.
33
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received if he or she confesses, or be faced with the cost of legal
consequences if he or she does not.39
When these tactics are used to interrogate a developmentally
disabled individual, that individual will frequently succumb to the
psychological pressures and give a false confession, regardless of how
ineffective the tactics may be on a person of ordinary intelligence.40 The
problem becomes even worse when, in addition to standard interrogation
tactics, police engage in outright coercive tactics, which will become clear in
the Singletary case illustrated below.
2. Recommended Interrogation Tactics for Questioning the Unintelligent,
Uneducated, and Handicapped
The authors of Criminal Interrogation and Confessions recommend
that when interrogators are questioning an unintelligent, uneducated, or
handicapped suspect, questioning tactics frequently used on children should
be employed.41 Officers should speak in simple terms, maintain a positive
attitude, and should not state a certainty of the suspect’s guilt.42 Investigators
should not try to convince the suspect he or she is guilty, threaten
consequences of guilt or denial, or promise good outcomes because defense
attorneys often point to such tactics when challenging the validity of a
confession for these types of suspects.43 Additionally, officers must make
sure that before an interrogation begins, a suspect has been read and waived
his or her Miranda rights.44
3. Obtaining Valid Waivers of Miranda Rights
To obtain a valid waiver of a suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights to
remain silent and to have an attorney present during questioning (“Miranda
rights”), two elements must be met: (1) the waiver must be “voluntary in the
sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than
intimidation, coercion, or deception,” and (2) the waiver must be knowing
and intelligent, meaning it was “made with a full awareness of both the
39

Id.
Guo, supra note 11, at 45. Developmentally disabled suspects are more
susceptible to police coercion than ordinary offenders. Id. (“In the U.S., post-conviction DNA
testing has exonerated a number of convicts on death row. Among them, the mentally disabled
account for a high percentage because they were more vulnerable to the psychological
pressures applied during police interrogation and thus more likely to make false confessions.”
(citations omitted)); see, e.g., Singletary II, 365 F. Supp. 2d 328 (suspect maintained his
innocence throughout the entire interrogation, but eventually signed a false confession).
41
INBAU ET AL., supra note 21, at 403.
42
Id. at 404.
43
Id. at 405.
44
See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 420–22 (1986) (citing Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–70 (1966)); INBAU ET AL., supra note 21, at 490–91.
40
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nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to
abandon it.”45 When examining the voluntariness of a waiver, the court
focuses strictly on whether any form of police coercion was involved.46
Additionally, a person’s developmental disabilities are consistently a factor
in the analysis of the “voluntariness” of a waiver, while courts tend to give
comparatively less weight to a person’s mental illness in that analysis.47
As illustrated below, proving that a waiver made by a
developmentally disabled suspect was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent
can be a difficult task, especially given these individuals’ hallmark
characteristic of showing deference to authority figures. Additionally,
empirical studies have shown that developmentally disabled individuals
frequently do not understand their Miranda rights or the concepts behind
them.48

45

421).

Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382 (2010) (quoting Moran, 475 U.S. at

46

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169–70 (1986). In Connelly, the
defendant suffered from schizophrenia and approached a police officer on the street to confess
for the crime of murder. The court held that the fact that the defendant claimed he confessed at
the direction of the “voice of God” was not sufficient to render his waiver involuntary because
no police coercion was involved. Id. at 170–71. Furthermore, for a waiver to be knowing and
intelligent, the state must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the suspect
understood his rights. Id. at 168. The Supreme Court has never held that developmentally
disabled suspects, by the very nature of their development, are unable to waive their right to
counsel or incapable of giving voluntary confessions. Young v. Walls, 311 F.3d 846, 849 (7th
Cir. 2002).
47
Ives, 648 A.2d at 134–35 (noting that the factors relevant to determining
whether a waiver was voluntary include a person’s “experience, education, background,
intelligence or capacity to understand the warnings and meaning of a waiver” (emphasis
added) (citations omitted)). Compare Walls, 311 F.3d 846 (considering whether the
defendant’s low IQ affected his ability to comprehend and waive his Miranda rights), and
Ives, 648 A.2d at 131 (considering whether the defendant’s borderline mental retardation
affected his ability to understand and waive his Miranda rights), with Connelly, 479 U.S. at
170–71 (rejecting the notion that the suspect’s confession was involuntary simply because it
was the result of his mental illness). The Supreme Court has held that although a defendant’s
mental illness may be considered as a factor in the voluntariness inquiry, the mental illness
alone without police coercion is not sufficient to establish that a waiver was involuntary.
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164; State v. Bilodeau, 992 A.2d 557, 560 (N.H. 2010) (reasoning
mental illness may be considered for determining whether police exercised coercive tactics,
but “[m]ental illness does not, as a matter of law, render a confession involuntary” (citations
omitted)). Furthermore, Officer Wahlberg stated that when he knows he is dealing with a
developmentally disabled individual, he is much more sympathetic to their situation and goes
out of his way to ensure they understand what is happening to them, as compared to when he
handles mentally ill individuals. Telephone Interview with John Wahlberg, supra note 26. He
stated that dealing with mentally ill individuals is much more challenging given the
unpredictability of how their illness will make them act, which frequently puts officers on the
defensive and concerned for their own safety, as opposed to finding sympathy for the
individuals. Id.
48
Cloud et al., supra note 19, at 501.
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4. Realities of False Confessions and the Waiver of Miranda Rights
a. Earl Washington
Earl Washington, Jr., was a 23-year-old African American male who
was mildly developmentally disabled with an IQ of 69.49 In 1984, he
confessed, was convicted, and sentenced to death for capital murder
subsequent to the commission of rape (“the Williams murder”).50 After
exhausting all appeals regarding the voluntariness of his confession, DNA
evidence later confirmed he could not possibly have raped Williams, and he
received a pardon from the Governor of Virginia.51
One year after the Williams murder initially occurred, Washington
was arrested for an unrelated burglary where he was ultimately questioned
about the Williams murder.52 The morning Washington was arrested for the
burglary, he was read his Miranda rights, said he understood them, and
agreed to talk without a lawyer about the burglary.53 During a second
interrogation that same day, Washington was again read his Miranda rights,
said he understood them, and the officers told him they wanted to talk to him
about a woman that had been “stabbed” one year earlier.54 Washington was
clearly nervous, began to shake and cry, and proceeded to describe Williams
and said he “stuck her with a knife a few times.”55 Although Williams had
also been raped, the officers did not tell Washington this, nor did he mention
it during this confession.56
The following day, officers conducted another interrogation where
Washington was again read his Miranda rights, said he understood them, and
signed a waiver form.57 After Washington signed the waiver of his rights, he
began giving his confession, but many inconsistencies appeared throughout
his recitation of the events.58 For example, at first he said the victim was
African American when she was actually Caucasian.59 He then said he
followed the victim into her apartment by kicking in the door, when in fact

49

Washington v. Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 577, 584 (Va. 1984) [hereinafter
Washington I]; Washington v. Buraker, 322 F. Supp. 2d 702, 707 (W.D. Va. 2004)
[hereinafter Washington II].
50
Washington I, 323 S.E.2d at 581.
51
Washington II, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 707.
52
Id. at 705–06. The only description Williams gave before she died was that she
was attacked by an African American male who was a stranger and acting alone. Washington
I, 323 S.E.2d at 581.
53
Washington II, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 706; Washington I, 323 S.E.2d at 582.
54
Washington I, 323 S.E.2d at 582.
55
Id. Washington described how he fled the scene, disposed of the knife, and, in
general, that it had been eating away at him; and, he felt better after confessing. Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Washington I, 323 S.E.2d at 582. He later corrected himself. Id.

http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol37/iss2/2

12

Devoy: Protecting the Vulnerable

2014]

PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE

265

the door had not been kicked in.60 Additionally, he said that he only stabbed
her once or twice, when she was actually stabbed thirty-eight times.61
At trial, Washington took the stand and denied everything, stating
that the officers had lied in their testimony.62 An issue was brought up
regarding whether he actually understood the waiver form, despite his
insistence during the interrogation that he did.63 The trial record ultimately
showed that Washington could not understand the waiver form or the
concept of a waiver.64 Washington’s defense attorney showed him a copy of
his waiver and asked whether he had ever seen it before, to which
Washington said he had.65 The following exchange took place between
Washington and his attorney:
Q: What is it?
A: Something about your rights.
Q: Well, no, you said it’s something . . .
A: I know it’s . . .
Q: . . . about your rights. How do you know that?
A: Well, it got one word and then it says of, of rights.
Q: Got a word and then it says . . .
A: I don’t understand that.
Q: . . . of rights. What’s the next line? Read it to me.
A: Says, before we ask you any ques . . . questions, you must
under . . . understand your rights.
Q: All right. Now, it says something on that paper about a
lawyer?
A: Says if, if you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be . . . I
don’t understand that word . . . for you before any questions
if you wish.
Q: Now, did [the deputy] read you that piece of paper, [the
deputy] read that piece of paper to you on the morning of the
22nd?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And did he ask if you understood it?
60

Id.
Id. During this interrogation, it came up that Williams had been raped, and
Washington began to describe how he forced her to undress and have sex with him while he
held a knife to her. Id. DNA evidence ultimately proved he could not possibly have had sex
with her based on the sample of semen collected during the medical examination. Id. The
officers then brought him to the scene of the crime past multiple apartment complexes, which
he first said looked unfamiliar, but then identified. Id. at 583. He also showed the officers the
field where he allegedly threw away the knife, but the knife was never found. Id.
62
Washington I, 323 S.E.2d at 583. He admitted to signing the confession, but
had no recollection of what it said and argued it must have been false. Id.
63
Id. at 585–86.
64
Hourihan, supra note 28, at 1497.
65
Id.
61
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A: Yes, sir.
Q: On the morning of the 22nd of May of 1983, what would
a lawyer have done for you?
A: I don’t know, really don’t know.
Q: Why do you think there are words on that piece of paper
about a lawyer?
A: I don’t really know.66
Washington was ultimately convicted, and on appeal the court
rejected his arguments that his confession was coerced, stating the police
engaged in no coercive tactics.67 In fact, the court recognized that there was
no evidence offered to suggest the interrogating officers actually knew
Washington was developmentally disabled prior to or during the
interrogation.68 To the contrary, there was ample evidence to show that
despite arguments that Washington did not understand the Miranda
warnings, he attempted to compensate for his cognitive disabilities by acting
as though he understood things when he did not, and by giving deference to
authority.69
Washington’s case is widely cited as evidence of how
developmentally disabled individuals frequently defer to authority figures
even in the absence of coercion, have difficulty understanding Miranda
rights and the concept of waiver, and have a tendency to voluntarily give
false confessions to crimes they clearly did not commit. This case also
illustrates that the deficiency in police education of developmentally disabled
individuals results in the use of standard interrogation tactics, which have a
dramatically different effect on these individuals compared to those of
ordinary intelligence. Additionally, it highlights how developmentally
disabled suspects process information provided to them by police officers,

66

Id. at 1497–98. The word Washington did not understand was “appoint.” Id. at

1498–99.

67
Washington II, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 714. Washington argued his confession was
coerced simply because he had been drinking the night before the first interrogation, had not
slept, and was developmentally disabled. Id. The court disagreed and stated that the police
were not responsible for any of these three conditions. Id. The court reasoned he was “warned
of his Miranda rights before the interrogation began. There is no evidence that Washington
suffered physical or psychological abuse at the hands of the interrogating officers. To the
contrary, there is evidence that Washington was not made any promises during his interview
in exchange for his confession.” Id. Additionally, he was allowed to sleep before the third
interrogation because he had been awake the entire evening before. Washington I, 323 S.E.2d
at 582.
68
Washington II, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 713.
69
Id. Regarding the involuntariness of his confession, the Virginia Supreme
Court essentially ignored the trial transcript, and instead relied on expert testimony that stated
Washington possessed the capacity to understand and waive his rights. Hourihan, supra note
28, at 1498.
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and how their confessions will frequently focus only on information
provided by police, rather than based on independent knowledge.70
b. Charles Singletary
Charles Singletary was a 40-year-old mild developmentally disabled
individual with an IQ of approximately 63 when he was convicted of
murdering his niece in 1995.71 Growing up, Singletary had been labeled a
“non-learner” in the public school system, attended special education classes,
and was completely illiterate with the exception of his ability to sign his own
name.72 Two years after the murder of his niece, he was told by his aunt that
the police had come to his apartment looking for him.73 When he arrived at
the police station, Singletary was asked whether he knew why he was there,
to which he responded, “[T]o take prints to be cleared of my niece’s
murder.”74 The police officer corrected him and said, “No, you’re here
because we’re holding you as a suspect for your niece’s murder.”75
The officer began the interrogation with a standard accusatory tone,
accusing Singletary of having “burn marks” on his hands from strangling his
niece two years earlier.76 Singletary denied the accusation.77 The officer then
70

See, e.g., Wilson v. Lawrence Cnty., 154 F.3d 757, 758–59 (8th Cir. 1998).
Wilson, a developmentally disabled individual, received a pardon after spending more than
nine years in prison for murder when an extensive investigation revealed that he had given a
false and inaccurate confession to police officers who were eager to solve the case. The
pardon letter explained that any facts Wilson confessed to were provided to him by the
officers, and any effort to provide his own version of facts proved to be inaccurate and
inconsistent with known facts. Id. at 759. Furthermore, there was no evidence to corroborate
or substantiate Wilson’s confession. Id.
71
Singletary II, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 331. This case was presented in the form of a
petition for writ of habeas corpus for a ruling on the adequacy of the defendant’s counsel at
his state trial for failing to properly explore the falsity of his confession, which was obtained
through police interrogation using trickery. Id. at 329. The court did not rule on whether the
confession was in fact false, however, it alluded to such a finding when it stated that “[w]ere
this a bench trial before this court it would give little weight to the confession and would be
compelled to find the petitioner not guilty.” Id. at 337. The court also noted that the confession
was the only evidence of guilt, and the defendant’s attorney failed to meet minimum
constitutional standards when he did not pursue an investigation over the validity of the
confession, given the manner in which it was obtained. Id.at 337–38. The court vacated the
defendant’s conviction. Id. at 338.
72
Id. at 331. The expert at trial testified that Singletary could not read the words
“bed,” “ship,” or “penny.” Singletary II, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 333. Singletary also only held
menial jobs, his most recent before conviction being “park caretaker,” and he had never been
convicted of another crime. Id. at 331.
73
Id. Singletary lived with his aunt in an apartment across the hall from his niece.
Singletary v. Fischer, 227 F.R.D. 209, 214 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) [hereinafter Singletary I].
74
Singletary II, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 332.
75
Id.
76
Id. At trial, Singletary stated, “I don’t know what kind of burn marks he was
talking about, he never explained it to me . . . . I kept telling him ‘I don’t know what you’re
talking about. I never committed any crime.’” Id.
77
Id.
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asked Singletary whether he could read, to which Singletary said he could
not, so the officer proceeded to read him his Miranda rights orally.78 The
officer did not show Singletary the piece of paper because he had just
maintained that he could not read or write.79 The officer left the room briefly
and, upon returning, had Singletary sign the piece of paper.80
The officer then began showing Singletary pictures of his deceased
niece and asking him questions about her murder, for example, whether he
knew what she was wearing.81 Singletary kept saying he did not do it and
guessed the officer accused him of doing it for money.82 Singletary said the
officer assured him nobody would believe him and said, “Who they gonna
believe, the white man with the badge or the black man on welfare?”83
Singletary continued to maintain his innocence, even when the officer
ordered him to get on his knees, cry, and admit to his sister that he killed her
daughter by accident and not on purpose.84 When his sister never came, the
officer said as an alternative, Singletary needed to make a videotape.85 When
Singletary asked the officer what the tape was supposed to be about, the
officer said it was to be of him “confessing to killing [his] niece Cassandra,”
to which Singletary responded “no,” and the officer said, “if you don’t make
the tape you’re going to jail.”86 After this exchange, Singletary ultimately
gave in to the psychological pressures and made a videotaped confession of
how he had killed his niece.87 When Singletary told the officers he did not
know what to say for why he did it, an officer told him to say he did it for
money.88
78

See Singletary II, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 332.
See id.
80
Id. (“Before he left the room he had two sheets of paper in his hand . . . . [H]ow
do I know he got me to sign the paper he raed [sic] from or not? It had words on it but I don’t
know what it was.”). While the officer posed the “yes” or “no” question to Singletary of
whether he understood his Miranda rights, there was no evidence that the officer engaged in
further dialogue to determine whether Singletary actually comprehended the warnings, or was
simply saying “yes” to a question he did not fully understand. Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. According to Singletary, the officer then told him if he went the officer’s
“way,” Singletary could get into a 24-month-long drug program and then be a free man, and if
not, “he could fix it to look like [Singletary] committed the crime and [Singletary] could go to
jail for a long time.” Singletary II, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 332.
84
Id. (“I kept telling him I didn’t do it, but he kept telling me I did.”). The officer
testified at trial that he had lied to Singletary when he told him his family thought he was
guilty. Singletary I, 227 F.R.D. at 215. The officer said the family would forgive Singletary
and support his “rehabilitation,” referring to drug rehabilitation. Id. The officer denied all
accusations at trial that he had “scared” or intimidated Singletary into making false
statements. Id.
85
Singletary II, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 332–33.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 333.
88
Id. Singletary hoped his sister would know it was a lie because Cassandra
never left money lying out at her apartment. See id.
79
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During the trial, an expert testified that Singletary’s sentences on the
videotape were simple and did not provide many details, the questions were
simple and elicited unelaborated responses, and much of what he said was
extremely general.89 Additionally, the expert testified that although
Singletary did not tell the interrogating officers he was developmentally
disabled, the officers should have known based on his inability to read or
write that he was not of ordinary intelligence.90 Singletary was ultimately
convicted despite the expert’s testimony, the obvious suspicions about how
the confession was obtained, and his status as developmentally disabled.91
This case is another example of how easy it is to obtain an invalid
waiver from a developmentally disabled individual, especially when the
officers do not outright know the suspect is developmentally disabled.
Furthermore, it illustrates how vulnerable these individuals are to the
psychological pressures of police interrogations when standard tactics are
used, and even more so when actual coercive tactics are used to obtain a
confession. Aside from the points where the officer actually told Singletary
what to say and how to act during his confession, the majority of the tactics
used were standard tactics engaged in during routine interrogations of
suspects who are not developmentally disabled.92
5. Dan Young: Realities of Developmentally Disables Suspects Who Are
Guilty, Able to Waive Their Rights, and Give Valid Confessions
Developmentally disabled individuals are capable of committing
crimes and, thus, cannot be exempt from waiving their rights or confessing to
crimes simply because their moral culpability may be lessened due to their
condition.93 The case below illustrates why the idea of categorical protection
has been rejected by the Supreme Court because not all developmentally
disabled individuals give false confessions.94 To the contrary, those who are
capable of understanding their rights should not be able to use their
developmental disabilities as an excuse exempting them from all punishment
for crimes they have committed.
89
Id. As an example, the expert pointed to Singletary’s statements, “‘I was
hanging out on the street. I wanted to get high and wanted to get money from her . . . . She
wanted to use her money for what she wanted to use [it] for.’” Singletary II, 365 F. Supp. 2d
at 333.
90
Id. at 333–34.
91
See supra note 71 (explaining the context of the case and how Singletary’s
conviction was eventually vacated).
92
See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text (explaining standard
interrogation tactics include dismissing claims of innocence, lying, and overstating the
likelihood of obtaining a conviction).
93
See supra note 11 (explaining that, in Atkins, the court reasoned that although
their culpability is lessened, developmental disability is still a factor of consideration).
94
See supra note 46 and accompanying text (explaining that the Supreme Court
refuses to hold developmentally disabled individuals incapable of waiving their rights or
confessing).

Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2014

17

Hamline Law Review, Vol. 37 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 2

270

HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:253

Dan Young was a mild developmentally disabled individual with an
IQ of 56 who had difficulty understanding abstract concepts.95 When left to
care for himself, he had a history of being uncontrollably violent, which
caused him to have multiple run-ins with the legal system.96 In 1994, Young
was found guilty for the crimes of raping and murdering a woman and was
sentenced to life in prison.97 Young’s conviction was based on his confession
and corroborating evidence of his dental records that matched a bite mark
found on the victim.98 Young appealed, arguing his confession should have
been suppressed because his inability to understand his Miranda rights
precluded him from giving an effective waiver, which “require[d] him to be
freed.”99 The court rejected this argument, reasoning that although he
struggled with basic general knowledge and had poor speaking skills,
Young’s waiver was “knowing” based on his concrete knowledge that a
“PD” referred to a public defender and of what a trial was for, even though
he could not explain how a jury works.100 Additionally, the court expressed
its confidence in finding a valid waiver when it reasoned, “[H]e has concrete
knowledge suited to his occupation as a career criminal . . . .”101
C. Existing Proposals and Practices to Limit Involuntary Waivers and
False Confessions
1. Improving Police Education
Scholars Drizin and Leo proposed training police officers how to
better identify developmentally disabled individuals so that proper measures
can be taken during an interrogation to prevent an involuntary waiver or false
confession.102 At least one police department in Florida (“Florida
Department”) has adopted this approach and requires that all detectives
receive annual specialized training in how to spot the characteristics of a
developmentally disabled suspect and how to properly interrogate them.103
95

Walls, 311 F.3d at 847.
Id.
97
United States ex rel. Young v. Snider, No. 01 C 6027, 2001 WL 1298704, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2001) [hereinafter Snider]. The appeals court noted that this punishment
was essential to protect society and to incapacitate Young because he appeared completely
undeterrable. Walls, 311 F.3d at 847–48.
98
Walls, 311 F.3d at 847. Young was also implicated by a related confession
made by his co-participant in the crimes. Snider, 2001 WL 1298704, at *1.
99
Walls, 311 F.3d at 848.
100
Id. at 849–50. Young could not explain what seasons were, but he knew that
winter meant cold weather and snow; he could not count backwards; and when asked to name
presidents who served after 1950, he said “Washington” and “Lincoln.” Id. at 849.
101
Id. at 850.
102
Drizin & Leo, supra note 11, at 1003–04.
103
Id. The North Saint Paul Police Department, North Saint Paul, MN, has made
steps to improve the training and education of its police officers in general; however, given
the limited amount of budgetary resources of that police department, and police departments
96
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2. Taking Special Steps to Ensure the Voluntariness of a Waiver
When police officers read developmentally disabled individuals their
Miranda rights, empirical studies have shown that the individuals are unable
to understand the basic principles of their rights and thus frequently waive
them in an effort to appear cooperative with the authority figure before
them.104 Scholars and student authors have advocated for changes in how
police officers explain Miranda rights to developmentally disabled
individuals. One solution is to take time to more fully explain the rights by
speaking slowly and clearly.105 The Florida Department requires interrogators
to ensure the suspect’s comprehension of the rights by asking the suspect to
explain what he thinks they mean before he can waive them, in lieu of
accepting simple “yes or no” answers.106
Other suggested solutions entail implementing procedures at police
departments that require special steps to be taken when interrogating
developmentally disabled individuals. For example, the Florida Department
has implemented a policy that requires officers to immediately notify their
supervisors before interrogating a developmentally disabled suspect.107 After
the interrogation is complete, each suspect must undergo a “Post Confession
Analysis” administered by either a unit supervisor or by a “team” comprised
of a psychologist, an assistant state’s attorney, and a Criminal Investigator to
ensure a valid waiver and a reliable confession has been obtained.108 This
evaluation consists of assessing the suspect’s description of places and
events, whether he was able to offer non-public information about the crime,
and whether he offered information that led police to the discovery of
previously undiscovered evidence.109

in general, can devote to training, generally one officer will attend a local or out of state
training and return to share the information with the rest of the officers. Telephone Interview
with John Wahlberg, supra note 26. However, police training involving how to deal with
difficult suspects generally involves information about mentally ill individuals rather than
developmentally disabled individuals. Drizin & Leo, supra note 11, at 1004.
104
Drizin & Leo, supra note 11, at 1004; Cloud et al., supra note 19, at 495–96;
Bretz, supra note 19, at 245.
105
Morris, supra note 11, at 298; Drizin & Leo, supra note 11, at 1004. In Walls,
psychiatrists testified that a person with an IQ of 56 would be able to comprehend Miranda
warnings if they were “made sufficiently simple and the suspect’s responses [were] elicited
with care.” Walls, 311 F.3d at 849.
106
Drizin & Leo, supra note 11, at 1004.
107
Id.
108
Id. A “team” only conducts the evaluation when there is no evidence to
corroborate the confession. Id.
109
Id. at 1004–05.
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3. Employing Special Interrogation Tactics to Avoid Eliciting a False
Confession
Scholars and student authors have proposed and supported efforts by
police officers to use specific interrogation tactics when interrogating
developmentally disabled individuals that are different from those used on
individuals of ordinary intelligence. For example, it has been argued that
officers should avoid asking leading questions to developmentally disabled
individuals because, due to their eagerness to please authority figures, they
frequently agree with suggested or implied answers regardless of their
accuracy.110 The Florida Department has implemented new department
policies where officers receive training on how to avoid asking leading
questions.111 Additionally, police officers should not lie about evidence or
other facts to a developmentally disabled individual because false statements
appearing to establish guilt are likely to result in false confessions.112
4. Videotaping Confessions
Some scholars have argued that all interrogations should be
videotaped, especially those involving vulnerable suspects like the
developmentally disabled.113 They argue that videotaping will help to
accurately convey what occurred during the interrogation, increase the
reliability of confessions as evidence, and prevent wrongful convictions.114
Studies have shown that once police departments implement videotaping as a
standard procedure, police and prosecutors readily favor the practice because
it reduces the claims of mistreatment during interrogations and the number of
motions to suppress evidence.115

110

Id.; Morris, supra note 11, at 298.
Drizin & Leo, supra note 11, at 1004.
112
Morris, supra note 11, at 298.
113
Brandon L. Garrett, Trial and Error: Learning from Patterns of Mistakes, 26
CRIM. JUST. 30, 34 (2012); Gail Johnson, Commentary: False Confessions and Fundamental
Fairness: The Need for Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations, 6 B.U. PUB. INT.
L.J. 719, 749–50 (1997).
114
Garrett, supra note 113, at 34. In 1997, a survey of U.S. police departments
revealed that videotaping interrogations improved the quality of the interrogation, there was a
decrease in the number of allegations of improper interrogation tactics being used, and it
encouraged guilty pleas. Johnson, supra note 113, at 750.
115
Garrett, supra note 113, at 34 (reporting that more than 750 law enforcement
jurisdictions in the U.S. videotape interrogations). As early as 1997, a study reported that
16.4% of U.S. police departments videotaped at least some interrogations. Johnson, supra note
113, at 749–50.
111
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Proposals to Limit Involuntary Waivers and False Confessions
The primary problem developmentally disabled individuals face
during interrogations is that police officers do not know the individuals are
developmentally disabled. As a result, police officers administer the Miranda
warnings and use the same interrogation tactics used on individuals of
ordinary intelligence, resulting in a high rate of involuntary waivers and false
confessions by developmentally disabled individuals. Thus, steps need to be
taken to ensure police officers recognize these individuals and verify their
comprehension of the Miranda rights before the interrogation for the crime
begins.
1. Improving Police Education with “Pre-Service” and “In-Service”
Training
Police officers should be required to complete training regarding the
complexities of interrogating a developmentally disabled individual. 116 The
training should include basic instruction regarding what it means to be
developmentally disabled and how it differs from mental illness.117 Scholars
Drizin and Leo’s proposal to improve police education was an exceptional
idea in theory, but it failed in practice to articulate exactly how or where
officers should be educated, as did its example involving the Florida
Department. 118 Furthermore, Drizin and Leo only focused on training that
licensed, “in-service” officers should receive, but neglected to address how
to train unlicensed, “pre-service” officers, which is of equal importance.119
The first step to solving the problem of involuntary waivers and false
confessions begins with improving police education at the inception of all
officer training at the state police academies.120 When officers attend a police
academy before becoming a licensed police officer, they should be required
to take a course on the fundamentals of developmental disability and the
common characteristics associated with developmental disability. More
importantly, they should receive training in how to identify those who do not
116
See supra note 26 and accompanying text (explaining how officers in
Minnesota do not receive any training on how to interact with developmentally disabled
individuals).
117
See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text (explaining the differences
between the two groups and the frequent confusion between them among police officers,
judges, and others involved in the criminal justice system).
118
See supra text accompanying notes 102–103 (explaining Drizin & Leo’s
proposal to improve police education).
119
See supra text accompanying notes 102–103 (explaining Drizin & Leo’s
proposal to improve police education).
120
See supra note 26 (explaining that all aspiring police officers must complete
the necessary educational training at the state police academies).
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have outward physical characteristics commonly associated with
developmental disability.121
Above all, officers must be educated on developmentally disabled
individuals’ predisposition to agreeing with authority figures.122 Because
most suspects are not eager to admit guilt, officers should be aware of
reasons that could account for a suspect who is overly cooperative, like
developmental disability.123 Additionally, officers should receive education
regarding common lifestyle habits and decreased abilities to live
independently or retain non-menial jobs.124 Such information could assist
officers in differentiating between individuals who live with others and retain
menial jobs by choice, from those who do so out of necessity due to
developmental disability. One final component of the training course should
involve instruction on how to properly interrogate a developmentally
disabled individual in such a way that he or she will not be susceptible to
giving a false confession.125 Requiring this training to begin “pre-service” at
the police academy will ensure all future police officers are fully educated on
this topic prior to becoming “in-service” officers.
The next step is to require “in-service” officers to attend either
annual or biannual training seminars as a requirement of maintaining status
as a licensed police officer. Although officers are required to attend fortyeight hours of specified training every three years to remain licensed, most of
that training is centered on firearms safety and similar training, instead of
interrogation tactics.126 The required training should specifically provide
information regarding developmentally disabled individuals as well as
mentally ill individuals, since the two groups are often confused.127 Such
training will ensure that police officers keep abreast of any changes or
developments in tactics that should be used to either identify
developmentally disabled individuals or interrogate them. As a practical
matter, the continuing education aspect should be available either in person
or online, given the remote locations of some police departments in the
121
See supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text (explaining the difficulties of
identifying developmentally disabled individuals who do not possess obvious physical
characteristics of developmental disability).
122
See supra note 18 and accompanying text (explaining that developmentally
disabled individuals are generally more eager to please authority figures than those of average
intelligence).
123
See supra text accompanying notes 19, 33 (explaining that developmentally
disabled individuals will frequently waive their Miranda rights in an effort to appear
cooperative with police officers).
124
See supra text accompanying note 14 (explaining the adaptive functions in
which developmentally disabled individuals frequently are deficient).
125
See supra text accompanying notes 41–44 (explaining recommended
interrogation tactics for developmentally disabled individuals).
126
Telephone Interview with John Wahlberg, supra note 26.
127
See supra note 28 and accompanying text (explaining the frequency with which
judges, lawyers, and police officers have difficulty distinguishing between developmentally
disabled and mentally ill individuals).
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United States. Requiring such education will also allow current “in-service”
officers to receive the same training that will be given to future “pre-service”
officers.
Once officers receive the “pre-service” and “in-service” training,
they will be equipped with the ability to identify developmentally disabled
individuals, which is the most challenging obstacle to overcome in the effort
to limit the number of involuntary waivers and false confessions given by
this vulnerable population.128 Involuntary waivers and false confessions will
be limited because once officers realize they are faced with a
developmentally disabled suspect, special steps will be taken to ensure that
the suspect truly comprehends the Miranda rights and is capable of giving a
valid waiver before an interrogation can begin.129 If the suspect is capable of
giving a valid waiver, the officer conducting the interrogation will be
required to use special interrogation tactics designed to limit the risk that the
suspect will give a false confession.130
Earl Washington’s case would have turned out entirely differently
had the police officers been properly trained in how to identify
developmentally disabled individuals. The aspect of Washington’s
confession that should have been a glaring red flag to the officers was his
willingness to confess and his eagerness to provide as many details as
possible to implicate himself in the murder.131 The only thing the officer said
to prompt Washington’s confession was that he wanted to talk to him about a
woman who had been “stabbed” one year earlier, to which Washington
immediately began confessing without further persuasion.132 If the officers
had been educated regarding the predisposition developmentally disabled
individuals have to pleasing authority figures, they likely would have
considered an alternative explanation for why Washington was so unusually
willing to incriminate himself, rather than assuming he wanted to admit guilt
outside the presence of an attorney.133 With prior training, the officers likely
would have discovered Washington was developmentally disabled.
Discovering this would have stopped the interrogation and required special
steps to be taken to verify Washington’s comprehension of the Miranda

128
See supra note 27 and accompanying text (explaining how the primary struggle
is determining who is developmentally disabled and who is not).
129
See infra text accompanying notes 159–163 (discussing the suspect’s
comprehension of his Miranda rights from the suspect’s perspective).
130
See infra text accompanying notes 190–193 (explaining specific tactics that
should be used to interrogate developmentally disabled suspects).
131
See supra text accompanying notes 54–61 (explaining the process of
Washington’s confession).
132
See supra text accompanying notes 54–55.
133
See supra text accompanying notes 66, 69 (explaining Washington’s inability
to understand his right to an attorney and his efforts to act as though he had a full
understanding of his Miranda rights when he did not).
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warnings and his ability to validly waive them, of which he was clearly
incapable.134
Improved police education could also have prevented Charles
Singletary from spending years in prison for a crime he did not commit.135 If
the interrogating officers had received special training regarding common
living and employment characteristics associated with developmentally
disabled individuals, they likely would have at least inquired into
Singletary’s background.136 An officer with proper training likely would have
considered the possibility that a 40-year-old man who lived with his aunt,
worked as a park caretaker, and had an employment history consisting solely
of performing menial jobs may have a deficiency in the adaptive skills of
caring for himself or living independently.137 If officers were more aware that
such circumstances could be associated with developmental disability, it
would result in officers creating a dialogue with the suspect regarding the
reason for such a lifestyle. A simple conversation could establish that the
lifestyle is either purely by choice or the result of dependency on others due
to developmental disability.138 Furthermore, if the officers in Singletary had
learned he was developmentally disabled, they would not have used their
standard interrogation tactics, which allowed the officers to accuse him of
guilt, reject his pleas of innocence, and make his situation seem absolutely
hopeless.139 Thus, officer training on developmental disability is crucial to
eliminating the problem of involuntary waivers and false confessions.
2. Implementing the Basic Intelligence Test to Ensure the Voluntariness of
a Waiver
Once officers receive special training in how to identify
developmentally disabled individuals, there will be less risk of involuntary
waivers of Miranda rights because officers will employ special steps to
ensure the suspect actually comprehends the rights and is not simply

134

See supra text accompanying note 66 (illustrating his inability to comprehend
the waiver form at trial).
135
See supra text accompanying note 91 (explaining that Singletary was convicted
despite suspicions of overt coercion in obtaining his confession).
136
See supra text accompanying note 14 (explaining standard adaptive functions
in which developmentally disabled individuals are frequently deficient); supra notes 71–72
and accompanying text (discussing Singletary’s educational and employment history).
137
This is not to say that all 40-year-olds who do not live alone and have only
been employed in menial jobs should automatically be suspected as having a developmental
disability; however, given the simplicity of such a lifestyle, it would at least be worth looking
into to make sure the person is living in such a way by their own free will as opposed to an
inability to live independently.
138
See supra text accompanying note 14 (identifying deficiencies in self-care and
home living as signs of developmental disability).
139
See supra text accompanying notes 34–39 (explaining standard interrogation
tactics).
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agreeing to waive them in an effort to please the officer.140 However, if
improved police education alone is not sufficient to ensure officers will
successfully identify these individuals prior to beginning an interrogation, an
additional safeguard would be to require all individuals interrogated for
felony-level crimes to take the Basic Intelligence Test that will further assist
officers in identifying developmentally disabled individuals.141
The test is designed to distinguish those who are unable to
understand their Miranda rights due to developmental disability, and thus
unable to knowingly waive them, from those who can understand them.142
Because false confessions are ultimately the product of an interrogation that
occurred after a suspect waived his rights, the best way to eliminate false
confessions is to ensure suspects do not involuntarily waive their rights due
to an inability to understand them.143 To ensure developmentally disabled
suspects actually understand their rights, they must be required to explain
their comprehension of them to the officers so the officers can make a good
faith determination regarding whether the suspect sufficiently understands
the rights.144 However, because the typical procedure for obtaining a waiver
is to simply ask the suspect to give a “yes or no” answer regarding his
comprehension, these suspects will never have the opportunity to explain
their comprehension of the rights if the officers do not first identify a reason
to engage in such a detailed dialogue.145 The way to trigger such a dialogue is
to administer the Basic Intelligence Test to measure the general level of
intelligence of the suspect, which will assist the officers in making a good
faith assessment regarding whether the suspect is of ordinary intelligence,
140
See infra notes 159–163 (explaining the proposed procedure for engaging in a
dialogue with developmentally disabled suspects to ensure they understand their Miranda
warnings).
141
The test should not be administered to those who are arrested in the field
immediately after the crime has been committed; rather, it is intended for those individuals
who either willingly come to a police station to answer questions about a felony-related crime,
like Charles Singletary and Johnny Lee Wilson, or who are brought to the police station for a
different reason and are eventually questioned about the crime, like Earl Washington. This
process should only be applied to investigations related to felony-level crimes because those
carry the most serious punishments.
142
See supra text accompanying note 48; Cloud et al., supra note 19, at 499–507
(explaining how empirical evidence has shown developmentally disabled individuals
frequently do not understand their Miranda rights).
143
See supra text accompanying notes 64–66 (explaining that Washington’s
confession came only after he waived his Miranda rights without a full comprehension of
what they meant); supra text accompanying notes 78–80 (explaining Singletary’s confession
came after he was orally read his Miranda rights and given a sheet of paper to sign to waive
the rights, although he could not read the paper because he was illiterate).
144
See supra text accompanying note 106 (explaining the practical application of
this process by the Florida Department).
145
See supra text accompanying notes 53–54 (explaining Washington’s procedure
for waiving his rights with a simple acknowledgement of his comprehension without further
dialogue); text accompanying notes 78–80 (explaining Singletary’s procedure for waiving his
rights with a simple oral recitation and signature on a piece of paper without further dialogue
assessing the depth of his comprehension).
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simply uneducated, or actually developmentally disabled.146 Information
learned from these tests will dictate whether the officers should proceed with
a typical recitation of the Miranda rights to the individual, or if the officers
need to engage in a more detailed dialogue with the individual to establish
his or her comprehension of the rights.147
This test and the process described below should be administered in
a pilot program with the Los Angeles Police Department and the New York
Police Department for a period of three years as they are two of the largest
police departments in the United States, and are in the best position to
measure the effectiveness of this test and process.148 If there is a decrease in
the number of involuntary waivers and false confessions of developmentally
disabled individuals, the process should be expanded to include more police
departments across the country.149 If the process does not reflect a decrease in
involuntary waivers and false confessions, it should be altered to reflect its
shortcomings until it is successful.
As a practical matter, the test should be printed on a sheet of paper,
and the suspect should write the answers by hand. This will help identify
those who are illiterate and perhaps suffering from other disabilities as well,
like Charles Singletary.150 The interrogating officer should administer it and
observe the individual write out the answers to the test. Requiring this type
of observation will allow the officer to see whether and to what extent an
individual struggles with the test.151 Additionally, if there is an opportunity to
videotape the individual taking the test, this will offer further evidence if
there is a dispute later regarding the suspect’s ability to waive his or her
rights.152
The questions should be extremely basic and test a person’s ability to
think concretely by asking questions about simple historical and geographic
facts such as: who was the first President of the United States?; who is the
current President of the United States?; and what two countries border the

146
See supra note 30 and accompanying text (explaining how officers are willing
to take different steps in an interrogation process if they know the suspect is developmentally
disabled).
147
See supra text accompanying note 105 (explaining how some developmentally
disabled individuals struggle to understand Miranda rights and would likely benefit from
different approaches requiring more detailed explanations of the rights).
148
BRIAN A. REAVES, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008 14 (2011), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/csllea08.pdf (2008 United States police department statistics).
149
If successful, the process should be expanded to other large police departments
across the United States.
150
See supra note 73 and accompanying text (explaining Singletary’s illiteracy).
151
See supra text accompanying note 66 (illustrating the difficulty Washington
had reading through his Miranda waiver form at trial, the struggle he had sounding out certain
words, and his inability to explain each right).
152
See supra text accompanying notes 113–115 (explaining the benefits of
videotaping interrogations).
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United States to the north and south?153 The questions should also test their
ability to reason abstractly by asking: what is a season? and how is a lion
similar to a tiger?154 Additionally, the questions should test their knowledge
of the legal system and ask: what does a lawyer do?; what does a judge do?;
and what is a trial for?155 These questions are designed to be so simple that a
person of either ordinary or average intelligence would have no problem
answering them correctly, which will help officers identify which suspects
are not developmentally disabled. There will certainly be people who are
uneducated but not developmentally disabled who struggle with the concrete
historical questions, but they will likely be able to convey what a season is in
a manner that will allow the officer to determine whether they are familiar
with the concept and able to reason abstractly.156 The real purpose of the test
is to weed out those individuals who struggle immensely with abstract
reasoning due to developmental disability.
If the individual does not struggle and is able to satisfactorily pass
the test based on the officer’s good faith judgment, then the officer can
proceed with a standard administration of the Miranda rights without further
discussion.157 However, if the individual struggles with the test, the officer
will be able to ask the individual about the parts he or she specifically
struggled with, which will help differentiate between individuals who
struggle because they are simply uneducated and lack basic knowledge and
cognitive skills, and those who struggle because they are developmentally
disabled. For example, if the individual does not know who the President is,
but is able to verbally explain what a season is, the officer will know that the

153

See supra text accompanying note 100 (explaining the exchange that took place
in front of the judge where Young was asked basic questions requiring general knowledge to
test his concrete thinking abilities).
154
See supra text accompanying note 100 (explaining Young’s inability to reason
abstractly to explain what a season was).
155
See supra text accompanying notes 100–101 (explaining that Young’s
knowledge of the criminal justice system was sufficient to support a ruling that he understood
his rights and his waiver was voluntary).
156
See supra note 100 and accompanying text (explaining Young’s inability to
comprehend and articulate what a season was due to his developmental disability).
157
There is no benefit to suspects who either fail the test intentionally or refuse to
take it at all because the test merely informs the interrogating officer of whether the person is
likely capable of comprehending their Miranda rights as they are read to them, or whether a
further dialogue about the Miranda rights needs to occur. If a suspect refuses to take the test, it
will be further evidence for the officer to consider when deciding whether that suspect is
developmentally disabled because developmentally disabled individuals are not likely to
refuse to do something an officer, as an authority figure, asks them to do. Additionally, there
is no incentive to fail the test, which could potentially slow the interrogation process as a
whole, because the only benefit received by an individual who fails is to have the officer
engage in a dialogue about the Miranda rights, as opposed to simply reading and demanding a
“yes or no” answer regarding the suspect’s comprehension.
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suspect is simply uneducated and can proceed with standard Miranda
warnings.158
If the suspect struggles with the entire test and is unable to
comprehend and answer the basic questions, officers will know that other
steps need to be taken before proceeding with an interrogation about the
crime. For example, the suspect should immediately be read the Miranda
rights and be asked to give an opinion as to what those rights mean.159 Based
on the suspect’s answers, the interrogating officers should be required to
make a good faith assessment as to whether the suspect’s opinions reflect an
accurate comprehension of the warnings.160 If the officers conclude after this
dialogue that the suspect does not comprehend the warnings, the
interrogation process must stop, and steps must be taken to provide the
suspect with an attorney, since clearly the suspect is unable to ask for one or
waive the right to having one if he or she does not understand that right to
begin with.161 Requiring a more detailed dialogue for the Miranda warnings
coincides with scholars Drizin and Leo’s proposal of taking more time to
fully explain the warnings to ensure the suspects are not blindly agreeing to
waive rights they do not understand.162 This process will also create a more
structured approach to ensuring the voluntariness of a waiver in a manner
similar to the procedure practiced by the Florida Department.163
On the other hand, if the individual exhibits a satisfactory
comprehension of the warnings, the next step is determining whether the
suspect would like to either invoke or waive his or her rights to remain silent
or to have an attorney present.164 Because it can be difficult for suspects to
clearly invoke either right, the standard presumption against a waiver must
still be in place.165 Any effort by the suspect to invoke either right, including
remaining silent, should be presumed based on the exercise of good faith by

158

See supra note 100 and accompanying text (explaining that Young could not
answer either question successfully due to his developmental disability).
159
See supra text accompanying note 106 (explaining the Florida Department’s
procedure for engaging in a dialogue).
160
See supra text accompanying note 66 (illustrating that a dialogue about
Miranda rights can reveal the fact that suspects do not understand them, like in Washington’s
case).
161
See Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 382–83 (explaining that a valid waiver requires a
suspect to understand what the rights are).
162
See supra text accompanying note 105 (explaining the benefits of simplifying
the Miranda warnings).
163
See supra text accompanying note 106 (explaining the Florida Department’s
process for securing a valid waiver of Miranda rights).
164
See Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 380–82 (explaining that invoking Miranda rights
must be done unambiguously).
165
See id. at 383 (explaining that a valid waiver will not automatically be
presumed and that the government has a high burden to demonstrate the waiver was knowing
and voluntary).
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the officer.166 If, however, the suspect decides to waive his or her rights, the
suspect should be permitted to under these circumstances.167
The officers in Young did an excellent job of identifying the
strengths and weaknesses of Young’s general knowledge as well as his
ability to reason abstractly.168 Identifying his abilities provided the court with
concrete evidence to examine when deciding whether his waiver was
voluntary, which is exactly what the Basic Intelligence Test will help
accomplish.169 If the interrogation begins with questions that measure the
suspect’s general intelligence, it will provide the officers with an opportunity
to better gauge whether the suspect will later be able to comprehend the
Miranda warnings and give a valid waiver, and will provide further evidence
for the court to consider.
Furthermore, implementing the Basic Intelligence Test will create
new procedural steps at the police departments piloting the process that will
help ensure the voluntariness of a waiver, improve the quality of
interrogations and the credibility of confessions. The Florida Department has
already created a policy requiring special procedural steps be taken by its
officers before interrogating a developmentally disabled individual, which is
something that should be adopted by the two pilot departments to ensure the
test’s effectiveness before imposing a uniform requirement across the United
States.170
Requiring special procedural steps to interrogate a developmentally
disabled individual could potentially frustrate police officers initially because
it requires an extra step to complete, in addition to complying with
procedures already in place; however, it is worth the extra step if even one
vulnerable suspect can be spared the lifelong consequences of involuntarily
waiving his or her rights and giving a false confession. If such steps had been
in place while Earl Washington or Charles Singletary were interrogated, the
officers would surely have discovered their status as developmentally
disabled and likely never would have put them in a position to give false
confessions.171
Washington’s case would have had a different result because
administering the Basic Intelligence Test would have allowed the officers to
better gauge his levels of comprehension. Had a dialogue about his Miranda
166

See id. at 403 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (explaining the presumption against

waiver).

167
See supra text accompanying note 101 (upholding Young’s waiver because he
understood his rights).
168
See supra text accompanying notes 100–101 (explaining the dialogue of
questions that established Young’s ability to comprehend his rights).
169
See supra text accompanying note 100 (explaining that Young’s answers to the
questions were a basis for holding that his waiver was valid).
170
See supra text accompanying note 107 (explaining the procedure of notifying a
supervisor before an interrogation of a developmentally disabled individual can begin).
171
See supra note 31 and accompanying text (explaining how officers would have
done things differently had they known the individual was developmentally disabled).
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rights taken place before his confession, the officers would have discovered
that he did not know what a lawyer could do for him or that he was entitled
to have one appointed for him.172 The Basic Intelligence Test could also have
given the courts more to consider when examining the voluntariness of his
waiver because the courts would have had more to rely on than the
conversation with Washington’s attorney and the opinions of various
psychiatrists that he was able to comprehend his rights.173
Singletary’s case also would have had a much different result if he
had been administered the Basic Intelligence Test prior to being interrogated
because the officers would have discovered immediately that he was
illiterate.174 This is not to say that all people who are illiterate are
developmentally disabled, but it would have at least provided the officers
with an opportunity to engage in a dialogue with Singletary to determine
why he was struggling with the test. If the officers had asked Singletary to
explain why he could not read or write, it would have come up that from a
young age he was labeled a “non-learner,” received special education, and
was in fact developmentally disabled.175 Furthermore, since Singletary would
have “failed” the test, the officers would have been required to read him his
Miranda rights and ask him to explain in his own words what they meant,
instead of simply asking him a “yes” or “no” question about his
comprehension and having him sign a waiver they knew he could not read.176
Given Singletary’s status as a “non-learner,” he likely would have struggled
in explaining what his Miranda rights were, which would have altered the
course of events that took place thereafter that ultimately resulted in his false
confession and conviction.177
Videotaping the test administration and any dialogue regarding a
suspect’s comprehension of the Miranda rights would also be immensely
helpful in documenting the exact circumstances that occur during the process
of obtaining a valid waiver.178 Earl Washington’s case likely would have had
a different result if each of his interrogations had been videotaped, simply
because his eagerness to confess and cooperate with authority would have
been documented in a way that would have better illustrated the context of
172
See supra text accompanying note 66 (illustrating Washington’s inability to
comprehend his rights).
173
See supra note 68 and accompanying text (explaining the evidence the
Supreme Court relied on which essentially excluded Washington’s conversation on the record
at his original trial demonstrating his inability to comprehend the waiver form).
174
See supra text accompanying notes 71–72 (detailing Singletary’s history of
illiteracy).
175
See supra text accompanying note 72 (explaining Singletary’s educational
history).
176
See supra text accompanying notes 78–80 (illustrating the simple procedure for
obtaining Singletary’s waiver).
177
See supra text accompanying notes 81–91 (detailing the process of Singletary’s
interrogation, false confession, and conviction).
178
See supra text accompanying notes 113–115 (explaining the benefits of
videotaping confessions and interrogations).
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his waiver and confession for the various courts.179 Likewise, had there been
a videotape of Singletary’s initial waiver and interrogation, there would have
been far less disagreement regarding the reliability of his confession, and the
district court’s suspicions of coercive tactics would surely have been
confirmed.180
3. Special Interrogation Tactics Must Be Used to Elicit Confessions, and
All Confessions Must Be Corroborated with Independent Evidence to
Ensure Their Credibility
If a developmentally disabled individual is able to give a valid
waiver and confession, the confession should not be admitted into evidence
at trial unless there is proof that the information was: (1) provided by the
suspect, not the officer; (2) obtained by special interrogation tactics; and (3)
corroborated by independent evidence.
a. Requiring Information from the Suspect
To combat the risk of false confessions, officers should not be
allowed to offer information about the details of the crime to a
developmentally disabled suspect; however, officers should be permitted to
speak generally about the crime so as to conduct an effective interrogation.
Suspects should be required to give non-public information with a sufficient
level of detail that only someone involved with the crime would know.181
Requiring that the facts of the confession be provided by the suspect instead
of the officer will ensure that they are credible and not merely an effort by
the suspect to expand on information provided by the officer.182 Ideally, the
most ironclad way to prove that the confession was based solely on
information from the suspect would be to offer a videotape of the confession
into evidence at trial, along with a sworn affidavit from the interrogating
officer as to the validity of the confession.183 If a videotape is unavailable,
officers should still be required to submit a sworn affidavit that they did not

179

See supra text accompanying notes 55–61 (describing Washington’s unusual
willingness to incriminate himself).
180
See supra note 71 and accompanying text (explaining the court’s suspicions
that coercion was involved).
181
See supra note 70 and accompanying text (illustrating Wilson’s utter failure to
provide any nonpublic information).
182
See supra text accompanying notes 54–61 (illustrating the oddity that
Washington only confessed during the first interrogation to facts relating to the stabbing,
which the officers told him about, and did not confess to the rape until a subsequent
interrogation, where he gave very general descriptions that remained focused on the presence
of the knife).
183
See supra text accompanying notes 113–115 (explaining the benefits to the
court of seeing videotaped evidence).
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offer any detailed information about the crime that could have influenced the
suspect’s confession.184
Requiring such a process would have prevented Washington’s
confession from being admitted into evidence at his trial because it is clear
that the officers provided detailed information specifying that the victim was
“stabbed,” and only during a subsequent interrogation, that she was also
“raped.”185 Washington latched onto both pieces of information when he
created his false confession.186 It is no coincidence that all of the information
offered by Washington during his initial interrogation about the murder
focused only on the stabbing and what he did with the knife afterward.187
Washington was not aware that the victim had also been raped until a
subsequent interrogation the following day, where suddenly he began
providing details of how he forced the victim to have sex with him because
he had a knife.188 If Washington had actually been guilty of the crimes, his
initial confession would have involved details regarding both crimes from
the outset. Had the officers used general references like, “a woman was
killed” and “she had sex at least 24 hours before she was killed,” it is
unlikely that Washington would have been able to give a credible
confession.189 To give a credible confession to corroborate such general
information, Washington would have had to correctly guess that the woman
was killed with a knife, as opposed to a gun or other weapon, and that the sex
was not consensual. Because it is so easy for developmentally disabled
individuals to expand on information provided to them, regardless of its
truth, special requirements should be followed to deprive them of the
opportunity to give a false confession before it can be admitted at trial.
b. Employing Special Interrogation Tactics
An additional precaution that must be taken to combat the risk of
false confessions is to require officers interrogating developmentally
disabled suspects to employ special interrogation tactics that focus on asking
simple, non-accusatory questions. The interrogation tactics recommended by
Inbau and Reid should be required in all police departments across the
184

See supra text accompanying notes 53–62 (explaining that officers testify at
trials regarding the context of waivers and confessions).
185
See supra text accompanying notes 54–56.
186
See supra text accompanying notes 54–61 (explaining the inconsistencies and
added facts to which Washington confessed after the police officers told him about the facts of
the case).
187
See supra text accompanying note 56 (explaining that although the suspect had
been raped, Washington made no mention of this during his first confession).
188
See supra note 61 and accompanying text (explaining how his confession about
the rape was extremely general and focused on the fact that he had a knife with him since he
knew the victim had been stabbed with one).
189
See supra text accompanying note 51 (explaining that DNA evidence proved
that, although someone had sex with the victim before she was killed, Washington could not
possibly have been responsible).
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United States, and only confessions obtained through use of these tactics
should be admissible at trial.190 These tactics take into account the emotional
and impulsive nature of these individuals and honor the limitations of
developmental disability by asking questions in simple formats and avoiding
accusatory language that is likely to make the individuals uncomfortable and
confused.191 Additionally, avoiding accusatory language will limit the
likelihood that the suspect will feel an overwhelming need to please the
officer and admit to whatever guilt he or she is being accused of, regardless
of culpability.192 If a suspect is accused of personally doing something
wrong, as opposed to simply being informed that a crime was committed by
someone, there is a greater likelihood that the suspect will make false
statements either to rectify the wrong he or she is accused of committing or
to resolve the situation so he or she can go home.193
Singletary’s case would have had a different result if the officers
were prohibited from using standard interrogation tactics allowing them to
accuse him of killing his niece.194 With the constant hammering of accusatory
questions, Singletary ultimately broke down and confessed to a crime he
knew he did not commit because he was told that he would go to jail if he
refused.195 If the officers had only interrogated him using simple questions,
Singletary may have had a better opportunity to comprehend the options the
officers gave him, and he likely would not have succumbed to the
psychological pressures of the interrogation questions.196
In addition to being prohibited from asking accusatory questions,
officers should never be allowed to ask questions that coincide with the
standard interrogation tactics.197 Officers should never be allowed to ask
leading questions because providing the preferred answer within the question
increases the risk that developmentally disabled suspects will blindly give
the answer that the officer appears to want.198 Likewise, under no
190
See supra text accompanying notes 41–42 (explaining the recommended
interrogation tactics).
191
See supra text accompanying note 42.
192
See supra text accompanying notes 20, 42 (explaining developmentally
disabled individuals’ tendency to become confused and overwhelmed easily and how
non-accusatory language can help prevent this).
193
See supra text accompanying notes 84–87 (discussing Singletary’s false
confession, which resulted in part from suggestions that both the officers and his family
believed he was guilty).
194
See supra text accompanying notes 76–77, 81–88 (illustrating the accusatory
tone of his interrogation).
195
See supra text accompanying 86–87.
196
See supra text accompanying notes 81–84 (illustrating that Singletary was able
to understand the basic questions he was being asked, but struggled in comprehending the
long-term consequences of giving a confession, since he thought he would be able to get into a
drug rehabilitation program instead of going to prison).
197
See supra text accompanying notes 36–39 (explaining the standard
interrogation tactics used by officers on individuals of ordinary intelligence).
198
See supra text accompanying notes 18–19 (explaining the tendency of
developmentally disabled individuals to blindly agree with authority figures).
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circumstances should officers be permitted to lie to suspects regarding
evidence or facts of the case. The proposals suggesting that officers “avoid”
using leading questions and “should not” lie to suspects are insufficient to
effectively combat the problem of false confessions because such proposals
do not provide for a complete prohibition on the tactics.199 These proposals
should be taken one step further to entirely prohibit all leading questions
during interrogations of known developmentally disabled individuals
because given how typical it is to ask leading questions during ordinary
interrogations, a rule that only requires officers to “avoid” asking them is not
enough to ensure they will not be asked.200
Asking non-leading questions is an effective interrogation tactic and
also avoids the risk of informing the suspect of non-public facts that the
suspect can latch onto in making a false confession.201 Singletary’s case
would have come out differently had there been a prohibition on leading
questions as his interrogation was filled with them. These questions were so
effective on Singletary that he eventually wore down to the point of
confessing to a crime he knew he had not committed.202 Although
Washington’s interrogations were not particularly aggressive or filled with
leading questions, his documented eagerness to please authority figures
would have certainly affected his confession had leading questions been
used.203
Lying to developmentally disabled suspects must also be prohibited.
The proposal recommending that officers “should not” lie to suspects is not
sufficient to combat the problem of false confessions because lying is
commonplace in interrogations.204 Given how dependent developmentally
disabled individuals are on authority figures for the truth, any false
representations by an officer will likely alter the suspect’s perception of the
circumstances.205 If the suspect knows he or she is not guilty of a crime, but
is lied to by the officer and told that family members believe he or she is
guilty, the suspect may willingly confess to the crime of which he or she is
199
See supra text accompanying notes 110–112 (explaining proposals and policies
that suggest officers should avoid using leading questions or lying to suspects).
200
See supra text accompanying note 35 (explaining the frequent use of leading
questions and why and how they are used).
201
See supra note 70 and accompanying text (explaining Wilson’s inability to
accurately provide any independent information about the crime).
202
See supra text accompanying notes 81–87 (detailing the context of Singletary’s
confession and the use of leading questions).
203
See supra text accompanying note 69 (explaining Washington’s efforts to mask
his developmental disability by pretending as though he understood his rights in an effort to
please the officers).
204
See supra text accompanying note 34 (explaining the frequency with which
trickery and deceit are used by police officers to extract statements from suspects during
interrogations).
205
See supra note 84 and accompanying text (explaining Singletary’s decision to
confess, in part, after learning his family believed he was guilty and would potentially forgive
him if he confessed, which the officer had lied about).
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innocent in the hope of improving the situation with his or her family, like in
Singletary’s case.206 Although there was no deceit used during Washington’s
interrogation, his situation would likely have been worsened if deceit was
involved given his eagerness to provide information about the Williams
murder in an effort to please the officers.207
Furthermore, use of the standard interrogation tactics that involve
convincing suspects that their situation is hopeless and their best option is to
confess must be prohibited.208 Developmentally disabled suspects are
unlikely to be able to fight off the psychological pressures that follow when
officers try to convince them that everyone thinks they are guilty, especially
when coupled with the standard dismissal tactic used on all claims of
innocence.209 Additionally, when officers try to discredit alibis and accuse the
suspect of lying, eventually these suspects will break down and often give
false confessions simply to make the interrogation stop, the way Singletary
did.210 The officers also told Singletary that he could possibly get into a drug
rehabilitation program instead of jail if he confessed, which coincides with
the standard second step of interrogation highlighting the benefits that may
come from confessing.211 Singletary, of course, relied on this information and
confessed, exemplifying the problems that occur when standard interrogation
tactics are used on developmentally disabled individuals. Similarly,
Washington’s case is a cautionary tale demonstrating that use of standard
interrogation tactics can have the terrible result of eliciting a false confession
given the vulnerability of developmentally disabled individuals. Because
developmentally disabled individuals are so easily influenced by information
provided to them by authority figures, it must be required that special
interrogation tactics have been used before a confession will be admissible at
trial.
c. Requiring Corroboration Through Independent Evidence
Confessions given by developmentally disabled individuals must
also be corroborated by independent evidence to be admissible at trial. The
Florida Department has an excellent procedure in place that requires a “Post
Confession Analysis” to be conducted to ensure the credibility of the
206
See supra note 84 and accompanying text (explaining Singletary’s decision to
confess, in part, after hearing that his family believed he was guilty and would potentially
forgive him if he confessed, which the officer fabricated).
207
See supra text accompanying notes 55–61.
208
See supra text accompanying note 37.
209
See supra note 84 and accompanying text (explaining Singletary’s decision to
confess, in part, after hearing that his family believed he was guilty and would potentially
forgive him if he confessed, which the officer fabricated).
210
See supra text accompanying notes 81–86 (illustrating that the officer accused
Singletary of lying throughout the entire interrogation until he gave his false confession).
211
See supra text accompanying notes 38–39 (explaining the second step of the
standard interrogation process).
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confession; however, the procedure is flawed for purposes of practical
application because in circumstances where there is no evidence to
corroborate the confession, as many as three people can be required to
perform the analysis, which is excessive given the simplistic nature of the
analysis.212 Because the primary purpose of the analysis is merely to establish
corroboration between the suspect’s confession and the evidence obtained,
the analysis can effectively be done by the interrogating officer who has that
information.213
Requiring such an analysis to ensure the credibility of the confession
could also have prevented Washington’s conviction because there would
have been sufficient evidence to highlight the drastic inconsistencies of his
confession.214 The same is true of Wilson’s case, where the court found that
none of the information provided by Wilson himself was credible because it
was inconsistent with known evidence.215 If the court had required the state to
produce some form of independent corroboration for the confession, Wilson
would have been released because the sole piece of evidence was his
confession, and it was grossly inaccurate.216 Likewise, Singletary’s case
would have been different because the officers conducting the investigation
knew he was unable to provide certain details.217 Because the crime took
place in his niece’s apartment, of which he was familiar, there was no
evidence that the information he provided was known to him as a result of
committing the crime, as opposed to simply having general knowledge about
where she lived.218
Officers know they cannot provide fabricated evidence to the state,
so requiring a sworn affidavit regarding the validity of a confession would
not be an unreasonable requirement for the criminal justice system to
impose. Likewise, comparing the information in a confession with the
evidence collected from the crime scene for consistency purposes is
212

See supra text accompanying notes 108–109 (explaining the “Post Confession
Analysis” procedure).
213
See supra text accompanying notes 54, 81, 70 (illustrating how the officers
who interrogated Washington, Singletary, and Wilson all had information about the crime
before the interrogations began).
214
See supra text accompanying notes 59–61 (illustrating the inconsistencies of
Washington’s confession where he said he only stabbed the victim once or twice, when she
was actually stabbed thirty-eight times; he said the victim was African American when she
was actually Caucasian; and he said he kicked in the door to her apartment, but the door was
found intact).
215
See supra note 70 and accompanying text (detailing a case that involved a
pardon after an extensive investigation revealed that Wilson had given a false and inaccurate
confession to police officers).
216
See supra note 70 and accompanying text (explaining that, upon further
investigation, it was discovered that the confession was wholly unsubstantiated).
217
See supra text accompanying note 88 (explaining that the officers told him to
describe his motive as one of financial gain).
218
See supra note 73 and accompanying text (explaining that Singletary lived
across the hall from his niece).
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something that officers must do to ensure the confession’s validity in the first
place, so there is not an excessive amount of extra work necessary to comply
with such a requirement.219 Thus, to protect developmentally disabled
individuals from allowing their false confessions to be admitted into
evidence at trial, officers must be: (1) prohibited from providing detailed
information of the crime, (2) required to employ special interrogation tactics,
and (3) required to provide independent evidence that corroborates the
confession. If officers fail to comply with these three requirements when
obtaining a confession from a developmentally disabled individual, the
confession must be inadmissible at trial due to the high risk that the
confession may be false.
B. Ensuring the Effectiveness of the Proposals: Developmentally Disabled
Individuals Should Not Be Categorically Prohibited from Giving a
Voluntary Waiver or Confession
To ensure these proposals are effective and not so protective that
they inhibit the ability to prosecute individuals who are in fact capable of
committing crimes and are a danger to society, developmentally disabled
individuals should not be categorically prohibited from giving voluntary
waivers or confessions.220 While developmentally disabled individuals should
not have their disability exploited by police officers or the legal system, they
also should not be allowed to use their disability as a means to render them
unable to waive their rights or give confessions.221
Young is a perfect example of why there cannot be categorical rules
prohibiting waivers and confessions. If such rules existed, Young could have
been released and given the opportunity to commit further crimes without
receiving proper punishment.222 Young tried to take advantage of the legal
system by claiming he should be freed simply because he could not
understand the Miranda warnings, despite the fact that he had just committed
rape and murder.223 Suspects like this must be punished and society must be
protected from them. These proposals are not intended to prevent the
interrogation and subsequent prosecution of all developmentally disabled
individuals. Rather, they are intended to protect those individuals who are
219
See supra note 61 and accompanying text (explaining that the officers brought
Washington with them to the crime scene to confirm that his statements were true).
220
See supra note 97 and accompanying text (explaining the court’s reasoning that
imprisoning Young was both appropriate and necessary since he appeared to be utterly
undeterrable).
221
See supra text accompanying notes 99–100 (rejecting the defendant’s argument
that, due to his mental shortcomings and inability to understand Miranda warnings, he was
incapable of making effective confessions, and must therefore be required to walk free).
222
See supra note 97 and accompanying text (explaining the court’s opinion that
Young would likely reoffend because he was undeterrable).
223
See supra text accompanying notes 97–99 (explaining the context of Young’s
confession and argument for suppression).
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innocent and incriminate themselves by reason of a disability over which
they have no control.
IV. CONCLUSION
Developmentally disabled individuals represent one of the most
vulnerable groups of people subject to criminal interrogations, and better
safeguards need to be put into place to ensure they give knowing waivers of
their Miranda rights and do not give false confessions. This begins with
better police training on how to identify developmentally disabled
individuals and how to properly approach an interrogation of them. 224 In the
event that police education is not enough to solve the problem, an alternative
form of protection is to require the Basic Intelligence Test be given to
suspects who will be interrogated for felony-level crimes. Even if only a
handful of developmentally disabled individuals would be helped by a test of
this kind, that is reason enough to administer a pilot program in the Los
Angeles and New York Police Departments to measure its effectiveness.
Furthermore, there must be a requirement that all confessions given
by developmentally disabled suspects are corroborated with some form of
evidence independent of the confession. Officers should also be prohibited
from using standard interrogation tactics on developmentally disabled
individuals because of the high risk that they will succumb to the
psychological pressures and give false confessions. Specific interrogation
tactics tailored to interrogating developmentally disabled individuals must
also be required to avoid eliciting false confessions.
It is imperative that conscious efforts be made to create protections
for these individuals that are reasonable, and do not unjustly hinder the
ability to prosecute those who are in fact capable of committing crimes. The
Supreme Court has never held that, simply by virtue of a developmental
disability, a suspect is incapable of waiving his or her Miranda rights,
confessing to a crime, or even committing a crime, and the proposals
articulated in this article do not suggest otherwise.
The proposals in this article are an effort to ensure that when waivers
of Miranda rights and confessions are given by developmentally disabled
individuals, they are credible. These proposals are designed specifically to
protect those developmentally disabled individuals who are innocent from
confessing to crimes they have not committed. More needs to be done to
ensure these suspects understand their Miranda rights so they can make
informed decisions of whether or not to waive them. False confessions are a
significant problem faced by the criminal justice system, and more needs to

224

The common theme among the cases cited supra is that the officers did not
realize that the suspects were developmentally disabled prior to beginning the interrogations.
See supra text accompanying notes 31, 68, 70, 90 (explaining the circumstances of Faris’s,
Washington’s, Wilson’s, and Singletary’s interrogations, respectively).
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be done to prevent false confessions from being given by vulnerable
populations, like developmentally disabled individuals.
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